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JAPANESE INVESTMENT TRUSTS
HIROO MIZUSHIMA*: HOWARD L. LUND**: MASAO SEKIGUCHI***
Introduction. Foreigners have been freely permitted to purchase
shares of Japanese corporations since 1950,' with the condition that
the principal would not be freely remitted abroad. Until 1960 little
attention was paid to this opportunity.2 The recent increase in foreign
interest in Japanese equities has coincided with the easing of currency
and exchange restrictions, particularly the shortening of the waiting
period for the conversion of invested principal to the original currency
of the investor. As of April 1, 1963, the waiting period was entirely
eliminated, with the expectation of increased foreign investments. Be-
cause of the significant increase of foreign offerings in the U.S. affecting
the U.S. Balance of Payments, on July 17, 1963, President Kennedy
proposed the enactment of a United States Interest Equalization Tax
of fifteen per cent on purchases of foreign securities! This proposal
has dampened the demand in the United States' for foreign securities-
* LL.D., Lecturer in Law, ChMih University, Investment Analyst, Tokyo, Japan;
Lecturer in Law, the Chi6 Law School, the postgraduate course of Chfi6 University,
Professor of Law, T6y6 University, Former member of the Civil Law Department of
the Legislation Council.
** LL.B. 1949, University of Utah, Member of American, California and Utah Bar
Associations. Investment analyst, Tokyo Japan.
*** LL.M., Student of the Doctor degree study of Chi16 Law School, the postgraduate
course of Ch6 University.
1 Foreign Investment Law (Gaishi ni Kansuru hcritsu), (Law No. 163, 1950), in
5 EHS No. 5410-20 allowed the purchase of stocks and the repatriation of dividends
in the currency of the investor but restricted the free conversion of principal to a
non-yen currency to installments over a five-year period after the sale of the security
for yen. In May 1961 the period during which an investor who had invested in
Japanese stock with foreign currencies was required to hold the proceeds from the
sale of that investment in yen was shortened to two years. In August 1962 this period
was shortened to six months and April 1, 1963, immediate conversion of principal was
allowed.
2 Purchases by foreigners through regular securities markets during 1962 totaled
$82,000,000, 70% above the figure for 1961. The total of these two years' purchases
equalled the total of the entire previous twelve years since the enactment of the
Foreign Investment Law. Naomichi Toyama, Why Foreign Investment in Japan Is
Increasing, 197 COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL CHRONICLE No. 6250 (Mar. 28, 1963)
§ 2, p. 12. As of March 1962 foreigners represented only 0.33% of the total number
of holders of Japanese stocks. Including corporations foreigners owned 1.66% of the
total listed stock issued. Ministry of Finance survey as of March 31, 1962, as reported
in 50 JAPAN STOCK REv. 2 (Dec. 31, 1962). These figures are also cited by Naomichi
Toyama, supra.
3 This proposal, not yet enacted into law, envisages a 15% tax payable by the
purchaser on the purchase price of most foreign securities.
4 There has been a decline each month since June in purchases of new foreign
issues. By September the flow had practically ceased. Treasury Secretary Douglas
Dillon's statement to the U.S. House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee
as reported in The Journal of Commerce Nov. 11, 1963, 11 (International ed. Pacific
ed).
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Japanese or other. There remains, however, a growing awareness of
Japan's investment opportunities. Among these opportunities is the
institution which has been described as "the best medium for invest-
ment of any vehicle yet devised..----the investment trust.' The advan-
tages of investing through investment trusts are much more compelling
when investing in foreign securities.7 It is interesting, but perhaps not
surprising, that the pioneer of all investment trusts was formed for
investing in foreign and colonial stocks.8
Scope. It is the purpose of this article to examine: a) the present
structure of Japan's investment trust industry in its own legal, histor-
ical, and economic setting; b) some similarities of and differences
between U.S. and Japanese law and structures; and c) some problems
common to both countries and some problems peculiar to Japan that
may make a comparative study profitable.
History. The first Japanese investment trust was the Fujimoto Secu-
rities Investment Association established in 1937 by the Fujimoto Bill
Broker Securities Co., Ltd. (predecessor of Daiwa Securities Co., Ltd.,
one of the big four securities companies of Japan).' This original invest-
5 Bullock, The Future of the Investnent Trust in Keane's Investment Trust Monthly
March 1932. Quoted in BuuLocx, THE STORY OF INVESTMENT COMPANIES. 71 (1959).6The investment trust brings together participating investors to whom are sold
certificates of beneficial ownership in a trust fund, and professional managers who,
utilizing the proceeds of these sales, select and purchase securities in other enterprises
on behalf of the investors. In the United States similar-type organizations, either in
trust form or corporate form (in which case shares of the company rather than
shares of a trust fund are sold), are known as investment companies. The most
popular form of investment company in the United States is commonly called "mutual
fund" and refers to a managed company continuously offering its shares and standing
ready to redeem shares at net asset value.
7 For the investor without professional investment advice, such factors as language
barriers, currency and exchange restrictions, lack of reliable, objective contacts with
banks, economists, etc., understanding of and time lags with respect to information on
world politics, social and labor movements, legislation, trade, banking, industry, and
company developments all suggest the media of investment trusts for foreign invest-
ment.
On the positive side with respect to investment in Japan, investment trusts have
special tax advantages and generally lower acquisition charges than in the United
States. See NOMURA SEcuaRriEs Co. ZEilN No HON (Book as to tax) (revised ed.
1964). DAiwA SEcURITIEs Co. ZEiKiN-DoiuHoN (Reader as to tax) (1964) On April
1, 1964, the tax law was changed to provide that dividends of investment trusts will no
longer be taxed at the source at 10% but will be taxed to the recipient at the rate of
5%, Law No. 24, Art. 8 (2), March 31, 1964.
8The original prospectus of the Foreign and Colonial Government Trust founded
in London in 1868 as published in The Times (London), March 20, 1868, states the
purpose of the Trust is to provide "the investor of moderate means the same ad-
vantages as the large capitalist in diminishing the risk of investing in foreign and
colonial government stocks, by spreading the investment over a number of different
stocks." BULLOCK, THE STORY OF INVESTMENT COMPANIES (1959) refers to this trust
as the pioneer of them all.
9 Four securities companies in Japan have accounted for more than 70% of the
total volume of transactions in Japan since 1956. These four are Daiwa Securities,
19641
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ment trust is said"0 to have had as its model the "unit trust" of England
and its legal basis in the association contract provided in articles 667 to
688 of the Civil Code of Japan." The interesting structural features of
this first Japanese investment trust are that it was organized by a secu-
rities company with money pooled under association contracts for
investment in securities and provided for a liquidation distribution
after three years with dividends to be distributed twice yearly. The
pooled fund was divided into equal units among a definite number of
contributor-investors. At a general organization meeting these inves-
tor-members elected an executive committee to determine the invest-
ment policies and to manage the fund. The executive committee's
decisions were executed by the Fujimoto Bill Broker. It is reported
that this association was soon dissolved because it was alleged to be
in violation of the Trust Business Law 2 and, in any case, suffered from
certain structural deficiencies.
In November 1941 a new "unit trust" modeled after the flexible
unit trusts of England was formed by the Nomura Securities Co., Ltd.
(also one of the big four securities companies of Japan). In this
instance, the trustor-manager was the Nomura Securities Co., Ltd., and
the trustee, who was to execute the trustor-manager's decisions, was
a trust company, Nomura Trust Company. This new trust had its
legal basis in the Civil Code, the Trust Law,"3 and the Trust Business
Law. In 1942 five other securities companies established similar invest-
ment trusts. In each of these cases, the organizing securities company
became the trustor-manager and used Nihon Investment Trust Com-
pany as trustee.
The structure of these war-time (November 1941 to August 1945)
investment trusts provided for a trustor, who was also the original
beneficiary of the trust res. The trustor-beneficiary then sold and
assigned" its beneficiary rights to an indefinite number of beneficiary
Nikk6 Securities, Nomura Securities and Yamaichi Securities. The Japan Times,
May 29, 1963 (Foreign Investment Supp.) p. B4, col. 1.
"o INVESTMENT TRUST ASS'N. (Shoken Toshi Shintaku Kyjkai), INVESTMENT
TRUST IN JAPAN 1 (1963). For a history and discussion of this original investment
trust, see YAMAICHI SECURITIES Co., TosHI SHINTAKU RON (Study of investment
trusts) 242-43; NIHON KOGYO GINKO, ToSHI SIIlNTAKU No KENKYU (Study of
investment trusts) 290-91 (1960) ; K6ichi Ishiwara, Fujimoto Yfcka Shoken Tshi
Kuniai o inegutte (Around the Fujimoto Securities Investment Association), 12
SHOKEN TOSHI SHINTAIUA KAIHO (Report of the Investment Trust Association).
1 These articles are contained in § 12 (Partnership) and ch. II (contracts).
12 Trust Business Law (Shintaku-gy6ha), (Law No. 65, 1922) in 6 EHS No. 6100.
13 Trust Law (Shintakuith), (Law No. 62, 1922) in 6 EHS No. 6130.
14 CIVIL CODE art. 467, with respect to assignment of a nominative claim, provides as
follows (in 2 EHS No. 2100) :
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investors, retaining the powers of management and, with the approval
of the trustee, the right to extend or reduce the term of the trust and
to determine the dividend rate. The beneficiary rights were divided
into equal units. The terms of the trust provided that the compensa-
tion of the trustee should be divided with the trustor in consideration
of the trustor's management. The trustor guaranteed up to twenty
per cent of any loss of principal and was to receive ten per cent of any
gain in principal. (This was considered necessary to attract those
investors accustomed to a fixed return.) Flexibility was provided in
that management had discretion to buy within a policy of diversifica-
tion and a limitation on the amount of investment in any one com-
pany. There were also certain conditions for selling. 5 These war-time
investment trusts were closed-end in the sense that the certificates of
beneficial interest were non-redeemable, there was no market for the
certificates, and they were non-negotiable.
In August, 1945, at war's end, subscriptions were discontinued. Over
a period of time the existing trust redeemed the outstanding certifi-
cates, in most cases at a profit to the holders,"8 and liquidated. The
total amount invested in these war-time trusts was If528.5 million
($264 million)."
When the war ended, Japan's commercial, industrial, and financial
1. The assignment of a nominative claim cannot be set up against the obligor or any
other third person, unless the assignor has given notice thereof to the obligor or
the obligor has consented thereto.
2. The notice or consent mentioned in the preceding paragraph cannot be set up
against a third person other than the obligor, unless it is put in a writing under a
notarial act (kakutei-hizuke).
The terms of the trust provided for the trustor to maintain the management right
despite assignment of its beneficiary right.
3. Article 5 of the 38th Yamaichi 12th (1944) Securities Investment Trust Contract
(trustor company is the Yamaichi Securities Co., Ltd., trustee is the Japan Investment
Trust Co.) provided as follows: The Trustor may, with the consent of the Trustee,
sell a part or all of a portfolio stock in the event that the following occur:
1. The average purchase price changes by 8%.
2. There is extreme danger of the company failing to make a profit.
3. There is extreme danger of the securities falling.
4. The refunding, conversion, increase or decrease of capital, distribution of stock,
or failure to collect unpaid share capital.
I NomuIRA SEcurrIEs INVESTMENT TRUST MANAGEMENT Co., LTD., A BRIEF OUT-
LINE OF INVESTMENT TRUST IN JAPAN 1 (1962). To indicate the background of this
remarkable achievement the following paragraph from this monograph is quoted:
In 1945 subscriptions had to be stopped due to the disastrous termination of the
Pacific War. However, it must be noted here that the investment trusts of this period
included the stocks of Japanese firms located both in Japan proper and her posses-
sions overseas. By the end of the war, therefore, considerable damage was inflicted
on the shares of the latter. In spite of this adverse situation, the investment trust
successfully liquidated its accounts and terminated its role by paying more to the
investors than the amount invested.
'17 Ibid.
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world was in ruins. This world had been controlled by the Zaibatsu."8
Under a policy directive from the President of the United States,19 the
Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP) was directed to destroy
the ownership and power of the Zaibatsu in Japan and establish a pol-
icy permitting "a wide distribution of income and of the ownership of
the means of production and trade." This directive was implemented
by a SCAP instruction (SCAPIN 244 of November 6, 1945) to sell the
securities of the Zaibatsu. The responsibility of disseminating these
shares was given by SCAP to the Japanese securities companies.
In 1948, the Securities and Exchanges Law20 was enacted by the
Diet; this law was patterned after the U.S. Securities Act of 193321 and
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. At this time, there was
interest in reviving the investment trusts through legislation modeled
on the U.S. Investment Company Act of 194023 (hereafter sometimes
variously referred to as The Act of 1940, the 1940 Act, or The Act).
A draft was prepared providing for both investment companies and
investment trusts but was violently opposed by the securities com-
panies.2" The main objection appeared to be allowing the new invest-
ment companies to underwrite securities. This objection together with
the SCAP feeling that such legislation was premature under the existing
economic and social conditions resulted in the draft bill not being
submitted to the Diet.
In 1949 the stock exchanges were reopened. 5 Before the year was
18 Literally, the "money-clique," commonly used to refer to Japan's great family
holding firms and the combines they controlled. Mitsui, Sumitomo, Mitsubishi, and
Yasuda were the largest and the most frequently mentioned of the 14 largest family
clans that dominated Japanese business activity. For an interesting discussion of the
size and make-up of these combines see BIssoN, ZAIBATSU DISSOLUTION IN JAPAN
(1954). Bisson notes at 25 that Mitsui in its prime had possibly 3 million employees.
19 Id. at 239 (pertinent paragraphs of the President's Directive to the Supreme Com-
mander Allied Powers dated September 6, 1945).
20 Securities and Exchange Law (Shaken torihikiio) (Law No. 25, 1948) in 6
EHS No. 6600.
2148 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1958).
22 48 Stat. 881 (1934) as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-78h (1958).
2354 Stat. 789 (1940) as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80 a-1 to a-52 (1958).
24 It is interesting to note the same situation occurred in the U.S. in drafting the
legislation for the Investment Company Act of 1940.
The first draft of proposed regulation, a draft originating with the SEC, was so
unacceptable to the investment company industry that it became apparent Congress
would not pass it over the industry's protests. The sequel was a unique and construc-
tive effort on the part of the SEC and investment company representatives to
hammer out a bill which would give investors the protection the SEC demanded and
give the investment companies a Magna Charta under which they felt they could
operate. Bullock, op. cit. supra note 8, at 77.
25 ADAMS, JAPANESE SECURITIES MARKETS: A HISTORICAL SURVEY 33, 37 (1953),
published by Seihei Okuyama, 1 Uchisaiwai-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, Japan. Adams
notes the stock exchanges of Japan from July 1943 were under the control of the
government through a joint stock company called the Nippon Securities Exchange.
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out the market collapsed under the supply of stocks. By 1951 there
was a pressing need to stabilize and energize a faltering market and
provide a supply of long term funds to business enterprise. As noted,
there were no investment trusts; there was a short, uneventful, and
profitable history of investment trusts and an engrafted policy of
"democratization of securities." In these circumstances, a conference
of representatives of government and the securities companies met
and cooperatively deliberated on ways of achieving a breakthrough
in the economic stultification. Investment trusts as a means of absorp-
tion of corporate shares was restudied. The result was a compromise
shaped to meet the needs of the time and preferences of the partic-
ipants. The bill presented to and passed by the Diet became the
Securities Investment Trust Law of 195127 (hereafter sometimes va-
riously referred to as the Law of 1951, the 1951 Law, or the Law).
It was not initiated, written, or enacted to prevent the recurrence of
past abuses,28 if there ever were any. It was not a result of any public
clamor, industry lobby, or investor interest. The prospective share-
holder, was not then, and evidently not now, concerned or interested
in shareholder or individual rights.2
The aim was the stabilization of prices and a smooth flow of securities. When re-
opened May 14, 1949, the exchanges were non-profit membership organizations
(Shadans Hajin) regulated by the new Securities and Exchange Law and designed to
be a free market with prices freely arrived at.2 
"Special notice should be taken of the fact that Japan's investment trust was
created in the hope of restoring stability to the country's securities market." INvEST-
MENT TRusT Ass'N (Shiken, Tdshi Shintaku Kyjkai), INvESTNT TRUST IN JAPAN
9 (1961).
The dissolution of many Zaibatsu organizations and successive capital expansions
carried out by many enterprises striving for recovery combined to flood the markets
with far too many stocks for the investors to consume. It was the greatest challenge
to the country's securities circles to stabilize the faltering markets and, at the
same time, facilitate supply of long term funds to a variety of fund-short enterprises.
It was under these circumstances that the reopening of the investment trust system
was seriously studied by both the Government and the securities circles.
NouJRA SECURITIES INVESTMENT TRUST MANAGEMENT Co., LTD., op. cit. supra note
16, at 2.
27 Securities Investment Trust Law (Shiken Tashi shintakuho) (Law No. 198,
1951) in 6 EHS 6120.
28 This was also the case with the U.S. Investment Company Act of 1940. Section
1(b), after listing abuses and adverse conditions, states in para. 8:
The policy and purposes of this title... are to mitigate and, so far as is feasible, to
eliminate the conditions enumerated in this section which adversely affect the national
public interest and the interest of investors.29 The authors' research has failed to uncover any reported cases under the law.
See Blakemore, Postwar Developments in Japanese Law, 1947 Wis. L. REv. 649
where it is pointed out that a single system of courts, staffed by about a thousandjudges has proved adequate in the past to serve the needs of a nation of over seventy
million people, and that the total bar of Japan is less than that of an American city of
a million and a half population. In 1960 there were 6,458 practicing lawyers in the
entire country. See von Mehren, Some Reflections on Japanese Law, 71 HARv. L. Rnv.
1495-96 (1958) wherein he states: "Compared with the West, there is in Japan a
19641
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Securities companies profit from buying and selling securities for
their own account or for the account of their clients, for which they
make a charge. By reason of the profits from such business it was
rightly considered in Japan that securities companies could (more)
economically establish and operate the investment trusts and could
afford to keep the acquisition and management charges lower than
could an independent trustor with no other business interests, profits,
or distributive machinery already paying its way by operating in the
same market as would an investment trust. As has been stated, the
primary purpose of reviving the investment trust was to provide, as
rapidly as possible, capital for a moribund economy and a market
for the oversupply of stocks. The conflict of interest implicit in allow-
ing securities companies to act as sponsors and managers of investment
trusts was a secondary consideration at the time. A government opin-
ion in 1955 condemned this practice; still, in 1958, the Minister of
Finance, under his approval powers,"0 licensed seven new securities
companies as trustors. In 1959, after the standing committee for
finance was established in the House of Representatives, a member of
that committee pointed out that such a dual role was violative of article
108" of the Civil Code, providing that one person could not represent
two parties in the same juristic act. The government denied a violation,
stating the trustee stood between the trustor and the beneficiaries and,
further, the government was studying the problem of separating the
two businesses. After much negotiation, 2 and some publicity, the secu-
relative absence of a strong consciousness of rights." See also von Mehren, The Legal
Order in Japan's Changing Society: Some Observations, 76 HARv. L. REV. 1174(1963). Here he states that: "Traditional Japan never evolved techniques of dispute
resolution appropriate for controversies arising in an individualistic setting."
30 Securities Investment Trust Law, art. 7(1) (Law No. 141, 1953) provides for
licensing by approval of Minister of Finance rather than by registration.
31 CIVIL CODE art. 108 reads in part: "No person may, in one and the same juristic
act, be a representative of the other party or of both parties; .... " 2 EHS No. 2100.
32 For a history of this negotiation see Investment Trust Ass'n, Shaken tashi
shintaku (Securities investment trusts), in 4 SHINTAKU JITSUM t KOZA (lectures on
business trusts) 48-58. The securities companies originally wanted to own all of the
stock of the trustor companies. The Minister of Finance could not agree to this since
it conflicted with the Anti-Trust Law limiting banks (including securities companies)
to 10% or less of the securities of any one company, but he did bow to the proposition
that a new trustor company without large capital might arouse concern in the investor-
beneficiaries and such a trustor would face difficulty in finding experienced professional
investment and office management personnel. After long negotiation it was agreed that
the securities companies would, within five years, decrease their stock ownership of the
trustor companies to ten per cent or less. Further, as to interlocking officers of the
securities companies and the trustor companies it was claimed they are not competitive
and therefore not under the limitations of the Anti-Trust Law.
The Minister of Finance provided the following guide:
1. The full-time officers of the securities companies cannot also be full-time officers
[VOL. 39
JAPANESE INVESTMENT TRUSTS
rities companies established "independent" management companies in
1960-61. We will consider the independence of these management com-
panies later.
Growth and Influence. Japanese investment trusts have flourished
under the administration of the Law of 1951. In twelve years' time,
net assets of Japan's investment trusts have risen from zero to over
three billion dollars.8 Fourteen per cent of the total market value of
approximately twenty-two billion dollars of all listed stocks on the
Tokyo Stock Exchange are held by investment trusts. 4 Ten per cent
of the daily volume on the Tokyo Stock Exchange is attributed to
investment trusts." By 1962 Japan was second only to the United
States in the percent of population owning investment securities.3 6
Investment trusts have contributed heavily to this "democratization of
securities." While there are no figures available to indicate the propor-
tion of investment trust shares held by individuals, it is assumed by the
Investment Trust Association to be approximately 99% of open-end
shares and about 90% of unit investment trusts shares. This assump-
tion is supported by the estimate that one of every ten families in Japan
hold investment trust certificates87 and the figure for the average per
capita holding which is $150.00.11 It has been truly said that the pres-
ent Japanese securities market is an investment trust market. The ex-
tent of individual ownership of stocks in Japan is indicated by a
Ministry of Finance report as of March, 1963 showing individuals held
27,166,675,143 shares of 58,030,229,788 stocks listed in the first sec-
tion of the stock exchanges (comprising stocks of 887 companies) or
of the trustor company; 2. officers of the securities companies who are full-time
officers of the trustor company may not exceed 50% of the trustor company officers.
Further: To aid in making the trustor companies independent a charge was instituted
for the purchase of investment trust certificates. The Trustor companies formed a
new sales company which would be paid for selling the shares. The sales companies
were formed with the trustor management company owning 90% and the securities
company owning 10% (except in one case where the trustor owned 100% of the
selling company).
33 The market value of all investment trust securities at the beginning of 1963 was$3,525 million (Y-1,269,331 million). Excluding bond investment trusts there was $3,142
million (T1,131,345 million). The total market value of all listed stocks on the Tokyo
Stock Exchange was $22,303 million (-8,002,925 million). The Japan Times supra
note 9, at p. B7.
34 See note 39 supra.
35 The Japan Times, supra note 9, at p. B7.
36 Terumasa Hasebe, How 'People's Capitalism" Was Achieved in Japan, 196 Com-
mercial and Financial Chronicle No. 6212 (Nov. 15, 1962) p. 5.
87 Central Committee for Promotion of Savings, Survey Relating to Motives of
Saving (Chochiku no Dakd-t6 ni Kansuru Ch6sa) 10, Mar. 1963.
38 NOMURA SECUrMTIES INVESTMENT TRUST MANAGEMENT Co., op. cit. supra note 16,
at 22.
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46.80%. Additionally, investment trusts whose shares are predom-
inantly held by individuals help 5,747,630,593 or 9.90%.9
In the United States, investment company assets approximate
twenty-nine billion dollars. The mutual funds4" account for approx-
imately twenty-three billion dollars of this amount and about four and
one-half per cent of the market value of all stocks listed on the New
York Stock Exchange.4
While it is difficult to determine what the ultimate demand for
investment trust shares will be, their present influence and rapid
growth in both Japan and the United States warrant an analytical
and comparative review of this powerful investment medium and an
appraisal of its success in protecting the investor, the money market,
and the free flow of savings and investment.
The Securities Investment Trust Law of Japan, as amended, consists
of six chapters containing forty-one articles numbered between 1 and
38.
What kind of law emerged from the above history to produce the
above results? What structures have resulted? What problems have
arisen?
The Law of 1951 is not complex legislation. It has few definitions,42
which are anything but elaborate. It provides a comprehensive system
of regulation of investment trusts. Regulation is accomplished pri-
marily through the licensing and approval powers of the Minister of
Finance. The standards, within which the discretion of the Minister
of Finance is to be exercised, are broad and indefinite. 3
The Law of 1951 provides for the trust form entity only, eliminating
the investment company entity as not being within the tradition and
requiring further study. It permits much of the structural and manage-
ment practices of the war-time investment trusts which served the same
39 MINISTRY OF FINANCE, KABUSHIKI BUMPU TOKYO CHOSA (Investigation of stock
distribution for fiscal year 1962) 17 (Dec. 1963).
40 "Mutual fund" is the common name for the open-end management investment
companies found in the United States, as opposed to closed-end investment companies.
See note 6 supra.
41 House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. A Study of Mutual
Funds, H.R. Rep. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. xi n.6, 6 (1962). See note 74 infra.42 Much substantive regulation is accomplished by definition in the United States.
The Investment Company Act of 1940 has 58 paragraphs of definition, some paragraphs
run from 200 to 300 words in length. The three definitions of the Securities Investment
Trust Law total 110 words.
43 For example: Article 12 requires that the Minister of Finance approve the terms
of the trust contract. Article 13 sets the standards for disapproval: "if inappropriate
for the public interest or for the protection of investors .... or violative of the laws or
ordinances, or for stating an untruth, or for failing to disclose."
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function of affording the small investor an opportunity to diversify his
holdings, spread his risks, and obtain experienced and continuing
investment supervision (irrespective of the objectivity and conflicts of
interest in that supervision). The organization and management of
investment trusts by securities companies was not provided for by the
law, but may be said to have not been specifically prohibited. This
"traditional" practice was reasserted under the administration of the
Law of 1951, when immediately after its passage seven securities com-
panies registered as trustors of investment trusts. In 1958 seven addi-
tional securities companies were licensed as trustors. In 1960-61 these
fourteen securities companies established fourteen "independent ' "
management companies and transferred their trustor functions to them.
The Law. Under the Law of 1951, the Minister of Finance is the
supervisory and regulatory power regulating by rule as well as by order.
As such, he is responsible for investor protection as one of the stated
purposes of the law. To accomplish this he is provided with authority
to compel complete, accurate, fairly presented information of any de-
gree of relevancy or materiality, including the character, circumstances,
policies, and financial responsibilities of the trust, its trustor-manager,
and the officers, directors, and ten per cent shareholders of the trustor.
The Minister of Finance is also given broad authority to license the
trustors and to prescribe the form and content of the contract of trust.
This allows him, among other powers, to provide any amount and de-
gree' of investor protection he may determine and, considering the
disinclination of the Japanese either to provide for or protect individual
rights, with little likelihod of judicial review." The substantive
provisions of the law will be considered below. Once licensed as a
trustor and doing business under an approved contract of trust, the
trustor has complete discretion in transacting an investment business
under the terms of the contract of trust and the proscriptions of articles
16 and 17 of the 1951 Law. An unprecedented loss of principal, or
violation of the Law or terms of the contract of trust could lead to the
44 The "independence" of these companies is noted in the agreement set out in
note 32 supra.
45 Except for the prohibitions of articles 16 and 17 on the buying and selling powers
of the trustor, which provide some degree of protection not subject to the discretion
of the Minister of Finance.
4 6 Masami Ito, The Rule of Law: Constitutional Developmnto, LAw iN JAPAN (von
Mehren ed. 1963) states that:
Any law regulating fundamental economic rights will be held valid unless proved to
be completely arbitrary and contrary to reason. Id. at 212.
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circumscription or termination of the business.4 ' Whether the operation
of the trust will be in the interest of the certificate holders largely
depends on the administration of the provisions for licensing of the
trustor and approval of the terms of the trust contract prior to the
actual conduct of the business of that particular trust.
ARTICLE 1 states:
The purpose of this Law is to facilitate investment in securities by [the]
general investing public, through establishing a system of securities
investment trusts whereby protection of beneficiaries of securities invest-
ment trusts will be enhanced.
ARTICLE 2 covers the definitions under the Law; the entire article is
quoted:
The term "securities investment trust" used in this Law shall mean any
trust, the purpose of which is to manage the trust property by investing
it in specific securities in accordance with the trustor's directions, and
whereunder the right of beneficiary is to be split up among, and acquired
by, an indefinite number of persons.
2. The term "securities" used in this Law shall mean those valuable
instruments (wertpapier) that are mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 of
Article 2 of the Securities and Exchange Law (Law No. 25 of 1948).48
3. The term "trustor company" used in this Law shall mean a company
which makes it its business to act as the trustor of securities investment
trusts.
ARTICLE 3 prohibits entities other than securities investment trusts
from investing in securities and having an indefinite number of bene-
ficiaries.
ARTICLE 4 provides that only a trustor company which is a corporation
with a minimum capital of Y50 million ($138,888.00) may enter into
4 Even after licensing, a failure to continue to conform to the requirements of
article 7 (2) i to iii will result in cancellation of the license. The Ministry of Finance
has no discretion to license or fail to cancel a license in these circumstances.
48 Art. 2(1) and (2) : The term "securities" in this Law shall mean those as men-
tioned in the following:
1. Government bonds;
2. Local government bonds;
3. Bonds issued by a juridical person in accordance with a special law;
4. Secured or unsecured debentures;
5. Investment certificates issued by a juridical person established under a special law;
6. Stocks, or certificates representing the right to subscribe to stocks to be issued;
7. Beneficiary certificates of securities investment trust or loan trust;
8. Securities or certificates issued by foreign countries of foreign juridical persons
and which are of the same nature as those mentioned in the preceding each item;
9. Such other securities or certificates as may be prescribed by Cabinet Order.
Such right to be represented in securities mentioned in the preceding each item shall,
even when there have been no securities issued therefor, be regarded as such securities.
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a contract of securities investment trust. The trustee must be a trust
company or a bank doing trust business.
ARTIcLE 5 provides that beneficiary rights shall be equal, divided into
bearer certificate units of equal value with the following information
on the certificate: names of trustor and trustee, amount of principal
of the trust, aggregate number of units, effective period of the trust,
time and place of redemption and of distribution of income, method
of computation and manner and time of payment of remuneration and
charges payable to the trustor or trustee. The bearer certificates may
be registered at the request of the holder. The open-end investment
trust form requires two additional statements on the maximum amount
of trust and the amount presently issued.
A securities investment trust cannot exist in Japan without a
licensed trustor. The licensing arrangement, covered under Chapter
II of the Law, brings the trustor and the trust within the regulatory
powers of the Law, which are vested in the Ministry of Finance,
Securities Bureau. Article 6 provides that any company which is to
act as a trustor company shall obtain a license from the Minister of
Finance who shall determine, under article 7, whether the applicant
meets the following two standards:
1. That the applicant for license is found possessed of suitability suffi-
cient for engaging in the business of the trustor of a securities investment
trust, judged in the light of the applicant's personnel setup, and experi-
ence and ability in investing in valuable instruments, as well as of the
state of securities market, etc.;
2. That the prospect of the income and expenditure in the applicant's
business as trustor of securities investment trusts is considered good
enough.
If, upon examination, these standards are met the license shall be
granted unless: a) the applicant is not a corporation with capital of
fifty million yen; b) the applicant has been sentenced or fined under
this Law or the Securities and Exchange Law and five years has not
elapsed since the sentence or fine was suspended or completed; c) the
applicant's license has been cancelled for the above reasons or its
securities registration has been cancelled under the Securities and
Exchange Law and five years has not elapsed since the date of such
cancellation; d) any of its directors are unrestored bankrupts, or have
violated the law or have been directors of companies within 30 days
of the time of that company's license being cancelled; or, e) if any
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false statement in particulars of importance exists in the application.
ARTICLE 8 provides for notification of denial of license with the reasons
therefor.
ARTICLE 9 provides for filing a certified notice of any changes in mat-
ters covered in the application for license. Articles 10 and 11 have
been deleted.
Chapter III covers the business of the trustor company. Article 12
requires that the trustor company shall, when concluding a contract
of trust, make it conform to terms approved in advance by the Minister
of Finance. Article 13 requires the filing of an application for ap-
proval together with a document stating the terms of trust. If the
terms of trust "contravene the laws and ordinances or be found inap-
propriate for the public interest or for the protection of investors,
or... [contain] false statements with respect to matters of importance
or there be failure to state matters of importance, the Minister of
Finance shall deny approval. ... " Articles 14 and 15 require approval
of the Minister of Finance for amendments or cancellation of the
terms of trust. Once the trustor is in business the only statutory
prohibitions with respect to its conduct of that business are articles
16 and 17.50 Article 16 prohibits the trustor from directing the trustee
to underwrite securities with the trust property or to grant loans
(except call loans) and defines "to underwrite securities." Article 17
prohibits the trustor from directing the trustee to acquire, except
through the market, securities held in the name of the trustor, its
directors or 10% shareholders, or to sell or loan securities held as trust
property to the trustor, its directors or 10% shareholders, except
through the market. Article 18 states the trustor shall apply for and
receive approval of the Minister of Finance before engaging in any
other business. Article 19 states the trustor shall prepare a report on
the trust property every six months, and within two months after the
termination of a trust prepare a statement of final account on the
trust property to be filed with the Minister of Finance. Article 20
requires the trustor company to prepare books and documents relative
to the trust property as well as to its businesses in accordance with the
ordinance of the Minister of Finance. 1 Paragraph 3 of this article pro-
50 See also note 38 supra.
51 The regulation as to books and documents of the trustor company of a securities
investment trust (Securities Exchange Committee Regulation No. 10, 1951), as
amended by the Minister of Finance Ordinance No. 50 of 1960, provided;
The regulation as to books and documents of the trustor company of the securities
[VOL. 39
164]NJAPAESE INVESTMENT TRUSTS
vides the only statutory right granted to the investor as an individual;
that is, the right to inspect or copy any book or document relative to
the trust property in which he has an interest.
Chapter IV contains the supervisory powers available after the trust
is operative and requires directors of the trustor to have the approval
of the Minister of Finance before engaging in the regular affairs
of another company or business undertaking. The approval of the
Minister of Finance is required to discontinue business, consolidate,
merge, 2 or assign a whole or any part of the trustor's business. The
Minister may demand materials or reports relative to the trust or may
inspect the trust property or books and documents of the trust, trustor,
or trustee. The Minister of Finance shall cancel the license if the
trustor comes under items (1) to (3) of paragraph 2 of article 7.3
If the trustor, or any of its directors, contravene the Securities Invest-
ment Trust Law, the Securities and Exchange Law, or the contract
of trust, or, if the assets deteriorate or grave losses are inflicted on the
trust property by the trustor, the Minister of Finance may cancel the
license, or revoke the contract of trust, or transfer the trustor business
to a new trustor, or order the trustor not to enter into new or additional
contracts of trust, or order the dismissal of any director causing such
violation, deterioration, or loss. The Minister of Finance may require
the trustor to publish in a newspaper designated by him (a) amend-
ments to the terms of trust granted under article 14, or (b) a six
months report on the trust property submitted under article 19.
investment trust shall be provided for as follows, under article 20(1) of the Secu-
rities Investment Trust Law.
The books and documents which the trustor must prepare under article 20(1) of
the Securities Investment Trust Law shall be the following:
1. Ledger as to trust accounts;
2. Detailed statement (account) as to profits used as dividends;
3. Detailed statement as to trust assets;
4. Register of beneficiary certificates;
5. Book as to standard price of beneficiary certificate;
6. Order of direction to invest in trust assets;
7. Ledger as to total accounts;
8. Cashbook;
9. Detailed statement as to the trustor's account receivable for remuneration;
10. Detailed statement as to undistributed income and capital gains;
11. Detailed statement as to undistributed redeemed money;
12. Detailed statement as to undistributed charges.
This regulation shall come into force from the day of its promulgation.
52 In the event of merger, consolidation, or transfer of the trustor's duties to a new
trustor, public notice is given and any beneficiary may file any objection within a
certain period. If a beneficiary does not object he is deemed to accept the new trustor.
If the beneficiary objects then his share is redeemed under the provisions of the
COmmERcIrAL CODE (Sh6h6) articles 245-2, 245-4 and 408-3, in 2 EHS No. 2200.53 See (a), (b), and (c) under art. 7, p. 527 supra.
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Chapters V and VI (articles 25 to 38) are of little substantive
importance. 4
Resulting Structures. There have been no reported cases under this
important law and hence no judicial review by which to observe
whether the industry has developed in ways unforeseen or unintended
by its sponsors or the Diet. Under the Law of 1951 both common and
anomalous structures have resulted.
The investment trusts of Japan are characterized as "contract-type"
as distinguished from "investment-type." 55 This means the investment
trust is established by a contract of trust between the trustor and
trustee for the benefit of an indefinite number of investors. The legal
rights and duties flow from this relationship rather than from a
corporation-shareholder relationship.
Two categories and five kinds of "contract-type" investment trust
have evolved. The structural and operating features common to all are:
1. By a trust contract, a licensed trustor (manager) company des-
ignates a trustee to set up a trust fund of money or securities for
investment in securities. The trustee is a trust company or a
bank engaging in trust business. The board of directors of the
trustor company have the ultimate fiduciary responsibility to the
investors."
2. The fund is divided into equal units of beneficiary rights, which
are then sold in certificates to an indefinite number of investors.
These beneficiary certificates are redeemable57 at any time. The
54 Article 25 provides that article 11 (1) of the Anti-Monopoly Law (Law Relating
to Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Methods of Preserving Fair Trade) (Shiteki
dokusen no kinshi oyobi K6sei torihiki no kakuho ni kansuru h6ritsu) (Law No. 54,
1947) shall not apply in cases where a trustee company acquires with the trust property
or holds stocks, provided, however, that this shall not apply in the case where the
trustee company may exercise the voting right of the stock in question. This has been
interpreted by the Minister of Finance Circular No. 201 of 1951 to mean those cases
where the trustee does not unconditionally assign the voting right to another. Thus,
if the investment trust owns more than 10% of the stock of a single corporation,
then the trustee has to unconditionally appoint another to vote those shares or abandon
the right to vote them. A problem with abandoning them is that the trustee may hold
such a large amount that no quorum might result. The practical effect is that irrespec-
tive of the amount owned, less than 10% or more, the trustee appoints another to vote
the shares.
5 The essential difference being that between a trust and a corporation. In the
United States, an investment company may be either a trust or a corporation. In Japan
only the trust is allowed and covered by legislation. Either the "contract-type" or
"investment-type" provides an indefinite number of investors with an opportunity to
invest indirectly in many securities by investing directly in one certificate or share.
56 They also have a primary fiduciary responsibility to the trustor company.
57 The right to redeem is not statutory but is provided for under the only terms of
trust that the Minister of Finance will approve. The right to redeem may be suspended
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certificates are bearer-type but may be registered at the request
of the holder.
3. The trustor operates and manages the trust by directing the trus-
tee. The trustor's main function is directing the investment, sale,
and reinvestment of the trust assets. The trustor also issues and
redeems beneficiary certificates and distributes profits. The trus-
tor has complete discretion in giving directions to the trustee for
investment within the terms of the trust and articles 16 and 17 of
the Law of 1951.8
4. The trustee buys and sells securities as directed by the trustor,
and serves as custodian and accountant of the trust assets, re-
ceives dividends, and endorses the beneficiary certificates.
5. The investor-beneficiary has no voting rights.
6. Securities firms designated by trustors to sell and repurchase invest-
ment trust beneficiary certificates are divided into three classes:
(1) those which have formed investment management companies
to handle their investment trust business; (2) investment trust
sales companies which are majority-owned by the trustor; and
(3) affiliates of those in Class (1). All three classes confine their
sales and repurchases to those of a single trustor.59
The categories and kinds of investment trusts by name and distin-
guishing characteristics are:
1. The Unit Investment Trust.6 The first to be formed under the
1951 Law and the most popular61 is also called the "semi-closed
in certain eventualities, such as the closing of the stock exchanges.68 The present limitations set by the Minister of Finance in investing are that assets
allowed to be held are a) Bonds, including government bonds, local bonds, bonds
issued by financial institutions, government guaranteed bonds and corporate bonds;
b) Readily marketable common stocks listed on national securities exchanges; c) Cash
deposits in bonds; d) Call loans; e) Investments in money trusts; f) No common
stock of any one company may represent more than 10%. of total asset value at
market; and g) The aggregate total invested in the common stock of any one company
on behalf of all investment trusts managed by a given trustor may not exceed 20%
of the total shares outstanding of such company.59 INVESTMENT TRUST Ass'N. op. cit. supra note 10, at 18.
60 This is a hybrid that has no counterpart in other countries. It is dosed as to
issuance of additional shares after the initial subscription period. It is open in that
the shares are redeemable at net asset value, minus tax and conversion charge, at any
time. For this reason it is also termed "semi-closed investment trust.*
61Unit trusts accounted for approximately 65% of investment trust assets at the
end of 1963--883,280 million. The Open-end investment trust (excluding bond invest-
ment trusts) accounted for 287,108 million and the bond investment trusts for
Y171,505 million. Source: The Investment Trust Association (Sh6ken T6shi shintaku
Ky6kai), Fukushima Bldg., 6, Mitoshiro-cho, Kanda, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, Japan.
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investment trust." This trust offers an indefinite number of five-
thousand-yen units during a one-month period. The lifetime is
fixed-all present unit trusts are for five years. Because the term
is five years with only a one-month subscription period, the trustor
usually establishes sixty unit trusts (one each month over a sixty-
month [five-year] period.2 At maturity, the investor-beneficiary
receives the market value of his shares plus undistributed div-
idends. 3 If the beneficiary redeems prior to maturity he pays a
charge of one and one-quarter per cent of the current net asset
value, plus from six per cent to one-tenth of one per cent depend-
ing on the time elapsed since the certificate was issued. The
regular charges to an investor are an initial five per cent sales
charge and an annual management fee charge of nine-tenths of
one per cent computed on the principal at the end of each fiscal
year." There is a one and one-half per cent price on all securities
sales.
2. The Open-end Investment Trust.66 The first open-end investment
trust was started in 1952. The open-end bond, open-end basic
industries, and balanced open-end investment trusts are variations
in this category. All open-end investment trusts have an indefinite
life and a stated maximum number of Y1,000 units which are
62 The closing of one unit investment trust and the opening of a new one every
month would appear to create problems of time, personnel, cost, and market influence.
Extension of one year is allowed. It may also help explain the statement of Matsui
that 70% of the transactions are on a back-to-back or wash sale (baikai), type of
transaction, within the securities houses. Matsui, Shokenkai no tOmen no msondai ni
tsuite--Shoken Torihiki Shingikai no gidai o chashin ni. (Concerning the urgent
problems of the Securities business-centering around the subjects given by the Secu-
rities Transaction Council), 143 Shoji H6mu Kenkyfi (1959).
63 A voluntary regulation (Reform of Investment Trust System, May 31, 1961)
issued by the members of the Investment Trust Association prescribed that distribu-
tions of capital gains and dividends of unit trust may not exceed Y310 yearly or 62%
of par value of Y5,000.
615This contrasts with the usual 8Y2% purchase charge and 3/2 of 1% annual
management charge by Mutual Funds in the United States. Practice varies in the
U.S. and some companies make no charge on purchase, others who have buying
programs whereby the buyer contracts to continue to purchase shares over a period
of time provide a large penalty for discontinuance in the first year-this can amount
to as much as 50% of the amount of the investment if discontinued in the first year.
66 This new and different structure was recognized through an amendment to article
5 of the 1951 Law. This amendment requires that beneficiray certificates under open-
end investment trusts contain two items of information in addition to the matter
required by paragraph 6. 1952 Amendment Law No. 141, August 1, 1953.
The Japanese open-end investment trusts are similar to U.S. open-end investment
trusts and investment companies, as defined by SEC, REPORT ON INVsTMENT TRuSTS
AND INVSTMENT COMPANiES, 799 (1940).
(a) the continuous offering of securities at prices which will net the fund amounts
equivalent to the net asset value of each outstanding share at the time of sale; and
(b) the obligation of the investment company or trust to redeem or repurchase its
outstanding shares by paying the equivalent of the net asset value per share.
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sold in units of ten-Y10,000-($27.77). The stated maximum
is many times the amount of the original issue and may be
amended upwards with the approval of the Minister of Finance;
thus, new certificates may be continuously offered. The redeemed
shares may be, and usually are, resold. There is no issue market
established for beneficiary certificates. The original issuers of
the certificates and their designated securities companies make
a market for them.67 This ordinary open-end investment trust
may distribute profits without limitation; also it may accumulate
twenty per cent of realized and unrealized capital gains each year
up to eight per cent of the market value of the trust fund.
The redemption or repurchase charge is two per cent plus the
regular securities sales tax of one and one-half per cent. The
acquisition charges are three per cent per share for each five hun-
dred shares or less and two and one-half per cent for each share
over five hundred. The management fee is nine-tenths of one per
cent per annum computed on the average net asset value.
3. The Basic Industries Open-end Investment Trust is similar to the
ordinary open-end investment trust except that its scope of invest-
ment is limited to twenty or thirty corporations engaged in basic
industries as determined by the trustor, as set out in the trust con-
tract and approved by the Ministry of Finance." The above three
types of investment trusts select their portfolio from the more than
1100 different stocks in more than 20 industrial classifications
listed with the TSE. Out of this number each investment trust,
with the help of research specialists, places into its portfolio 100
to 150 favorable stocks from roughly 450 stocks considered suit-
able, resulting in extremely well balanced investments. 69
4. The Bond Open-end Investment Trust0 is limited to investment
67 Itsuo Minami, Contrast Between Securities Markets in Japan and the U.S.A.
197 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, No. 6250, Mar. 28, 1963 § 2, p. 10.68The Basic Industries Open-end Investment Trust Contract is quite similar to
the Open-end Investment Trust Contract other than its portfolio of investment. Article
20 of the 1961 Nikko Basic Industries Open-end Securities Investment Trust Contract
(Dec. 2, 1961) states:
The stocks directed by the Trustor to invest in shall be exclusively those listed on
securities exchange, belonging to electric power, iron and steel, and other basic
industries previously specified by the Trustor.
The Nikko Contract, supra, specified 30 basic industries.
6 9 Noi OuA SECURITIES INVESmTMrr TRUST MANAGEMENT Co., LTD. op. cit. supra
note 16, at 12.7 0 Only 3% of the debt of Japanese companies is debentures. The debenture market
continues weak with the result that this type of security has little appeal to the
investing public. See Christensen, Japanese Equity Financing, 38 WAsH. L. RE.' 105,
108 (1963).
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in bonds and debentures. Distributions of principal are limited
to seven and seventy-seven one-hundredth per cent per year. The
units are one yen per value and the minimum purchase is in units
of ten thousand. There is no acquisition charge on new certif-
icates. The redemption charge is one per cent. The management
charge is two-tenths of one per cent of the average principal. New
certificates may be purchased only during the month of the an-
niversary of the founding when the bonds have become ex-rights.
Because of the one month per year subscription period, the larger
companies establish twelve open-end bond investment trusts, one
each month.
5. Balanced Open-end Investment Trust. April 15, 1964 saw the
introduction of the first two balanced funds. Two more followed
in that month. The first two operate under a required ratio of not
more than 65% in common stocks with the balance in bonds and
call loans or cash. The other two have a ratio set by the trust
agreement of not more than 60% in common stocks, the balance
being in bonds, etc. The total invested in all four trusts is approx-
imately $11 million.
COMPARATIVE EVALUATION
No studies of Japanese investment trust law have been found. This
void, plus a total absence of judicial pronouncements on the law or its
implementing regulations, suggests the need for a comparative study
to measure the law and structures against the legislative intent and the
common function of investment trusts.7:
Comparative studies of U.S. investment company law and Japanese
investment trust law have been done seldom, if at all. The main diffi-
culty in making such a study is that the economic, social, legal history,
and environment of each country is markedly different from the other's.
On the other hand, several factors indicate the possibility and profit-
ability of such a study. One such factor is that the 1951 Law is
supposedly largely based on the U.S. Investment Company Act of
1940.72 Another factor is the basic and general similarity of the
Japanese investment trusts and the U.S. managed, open-end invest-
ment companies (mutual funds)." This last factor is enhanced by
71 This function is to afford the small investor an opportunity to diversify his hold-
ings, spread his risks, and obtain competent and continuing investment supervision.
7254 Stat. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a 1 to 52 (1958).
73 All Japanese investment trusts provide for repurchase (redemption) at net asset
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the availability of a recently completed investigation of U.S. mutual
Finance and Commerce of the University of Pennsylvania for the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission 4 (hereafter re-
ferred to as the Wharton Study).
As an aid in evaluating and applying to Japan's investment trusts
the findings and conclusions of the Wharton Study with reference to
investor protection, portfolio company control, and market impact,
comments on a few of the pertinent counterpart provisions from the
detailed coverage of the 1940 Act are here set out."5
The 1940 Act. The declared policy and purpose of the 1940 Act are
to mitigate and, where feasible, eliminate the abuses found to exist in
the investment company industry in the United States while giving
government sanction to this investment media. This is accomplished
by full disclosure of information regarding investment companies and
their securities both to the supervising governmental body (the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission), and to the general investing public,
and by the regulation of the activities of investment companies.
value, at any time at the option of the holder, and in this most characteristic respect
are open-end. The main distinctions between Japanese open-end investment trusts
and Japanese unit investment trusts are that the unit type is not continuously offered
and has a definite due date whereas the open-end type is continuously offered with
no definite due date. The open-end investment company (mutual fund) in the United
States is defined:
A company is of the "open-end" type if a shareholder has the right, upon giving the
prescribed notice, to require the company to purchase or redeem or cause the pur-
chase or redemption of the shares representing his proportionate interest in the
company's properties, or the cash equivalent of such interest, often at a stated small
discount.
1 SEC REP. ON INVESTMENT TRuSTS AND INVEsTMENT COMPANIES 27 (1940). See
also note 66 supra. A typical "imutual fund" will be organized by persons who will
also organize a management company to manage the fund. The management company
will usually contract with an investment advisor for advice; the usual charge by the
investment advisor is one-half of one percent of the principal of the fund advised.
7 This study, the most comprehensive in twenty-five years, was prepared for the
SEC by the Wharton School, presented to Congress, and made available to the public
as H.R. Rep. No. 2274, 87th Cong. 2d Sess. (1962) (hereinafter cited as the Wharton
Study).
According to this study, as of June 30, 1958, the 156 companies included in the report
held 96.8% of the total open-end investment companies registered under the Act. At
this time open-end investment companies held approximately 65% of the total assets
of all registered investment companies. Id. at 288.
75 For an invaluable analysis of the 1940 Act and the background of its enactment
see Jaretski The Investment Company Act of 1940, 26 WAsH. U.L.Q. 303 (1941).
Jaretski notes that the 1940 Act had the unanimous approval of both industry and
Congress at the time of its enactment. Only slight changes have been made to date.
The Wharton Study and some continuing studies by the SEC indicate the Act is
presently being reviewed with particular attention to questions of investor protection
as it pertains to the affiliation of investment company advisors and management com-
panies, professionalism of investment advisors and salesmen, charges, results of
professional advice in relation to charges, and effectiveness of the independent directors.
On this last subject see Business Week, March 7, 1964, p. 88.
19641
VASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
The Act requires the registration of most"6 non-exempted investment
companies and their shares. Such registered companies thereby ac-
quire a status which simplifies administrative control. After registra-
tion a company must comply with various reporting requirements
designed to provide the Securities and Exchange Commission (here-
after referred to as the SEC), the company shareholders, and the
general public with current information concerning its operation. The
SEC, as administrator of the Act, has the duty to make sure that the
various provisions of the law are met. It has little opportunity to im-
pose restrictions inasmuch as its powers revolve around disclosure
rather than the merits of an issue or the fairness of the charges. The
SEC does have wide discretion with respect to registration statements
and periodic reports and in its powers to exempt companies from the
Act. Unofficially, it exercises a policing power in its processing of
proxy statements and in the registration of securities." Investment
companies are more often concerned with the sale of their securities,
which must be registered under the Securities Act of 1933, than with
any other aspect of SEC administration. Closed-end companies, which
are seldom selling their securities, are not as involved in sales as are
the mutual funds which must maintain a current prospectus in order
to continue offering and selling their shares to the public.
The Act of 1940 gives investment company shareholders certain
formal rights to participate in decisions involving the initiation and
continuance of investment management and underwriting contracts.
Shareholders are further protected by explicit information on the com-
pany investment policy and must be involved in any change in the
nature of that policy. Shareholders vote for directors annually and
receive company reports not less than semi-annually. At least forty per
cent of the directors of the management company must be independent
of any affiliation with the management company, and a majority must
be independent of any affiliated broker or underwriter. Section 17
prohibits, unless SEC approval is given, specified types of transactions
between any affiliated person, promoter, or principal underwriter of
78 Investment companies with assets of less than $100,000 need not register.
7T The timing of new issues by closed-end funds is important and requires prompt
clearance of the registration by the SEC. Most open-end companies have vital sales
organizations which would disintegrate if selling were interrupted. The recurrent
filings by investment companies puts the SEC in a strong position to impose its views
without resort to enforcement machinery of the laws. The investment companies are
seldom in a position to resort to administrative proceedings, judicial review, or other
right-protecting mechanisms which are time-consuming procedures, to determine the
correctness of the SEC position.
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an investment company or affiliated persons of any such persons and
the investment company. Borrowing by mutual funds is limited by a
requirement of 300% asset coverage at all times. No senior securities
are allowed to be issued by mutual funds and their shares are valued
at asset value.
Portfolio company control is regulated by section 5(b) (1), provid-
ing that seventy-five per cent of the total assets of a diversified fund
shall meet the requirements that: 1) no more than five per cent of the
assets of the fund may be invested in the voting securities of any one
company; and 2) the fund may not hold more than ten per cent of
the outstanding voting securities of any one portfolio company. A
diversified registered investment company is given desirable tax ben-
efits. Within the framework of its registered investment policy and the
five and ten per cent rules for diversification there is little restraint on
management's judgment regarding investment. The regulatory powers
of the SEC do not, however, include any effective means of insuring
expertise of management in investing.
The Act has served well. It was passed with the unanimous approval
of both the industry and government and has undergone only slight
changes in twenty-four years. The investigation by the Wharton
School and the continuing SEC studies have so far revealed no blatant
excesses or abuses. It is expected, however, that out of these studies a
number of proposals for amendment will be made.
The Wharton Study. The Wharton Study originally covered 156
(later 232) open-end investment companies whose assets in 1958 com-
prised approximately 96% of all registered open-end company assets.
Registered open-end investment companies as of December 31, 1961,
totaled 344 with aggregate assets of $24.4 billion. As of June 30, 1961,
all registered investment companies had total assets of $29 billion.
The Wharton Study concluded that the most important and critical
area of concern was that of investor protection, particularly the prob-
lems of conflict of interest between fund management and shareholders,
and the possible absence of arm's-length bargaining between the fund
manager and the investment adviser. Another area of growing concern
was that of market influence of mutual funds and investment com-
panies as a whole. Considered of no present serious consequence was
the problem of fund size in all its aspects, particularly from the stand-
point of fund control of portfolio companies. The findings leading to
these conclusions (as well as some findings and conclusions on invest-
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ment company and fund performance) are considered to have varying
degrees of applicability to the Japanese investment trust industry.
Investor Protection. We have previously noted that the trustor-
manager was originally a securities company which was also the or-
ganizer, underwriter, and investment adviser to the fund, as well as
an underwriter, broker, dealer, and investment adviser to its securities
clients; and that in 1961 the trustor securities companies, under an
agreement worked out with the government, placed their trustor-
manager functions into fourteen separate management companies. The
securities companies continued to supply their names, offices, officers,
directors, and sales outlets to the new management companies." This
legal separation of the management company and broker is not greatly
different than the situation prevailing in the United States where the
management company is usually only legally separated from the in-
vestment adviser and the broker.79 In Japan, contrary to the situation
in the United States, the fourteen trustor-manager companies and
their parent companies control the investment trust industry one hun-
dred per cent and also account for most of the securities transactions
in Japan. The four largest management companies account for over
eighty per cent of all investment trust assets through over two hundred
investment trusts, while their parent companies account directly for
over seventy per cent of the day-to-day market transactions on the
stock exchange and indirectly for a much larger percentage. The busi-
ness of the trustor company may or may not provide a conflict of inter-
ests for its board of directors depending on whether or not the trustor
company and its directors have other business or other business affil-
iations, direct or indirect, and, if so what that other business is. Even
though the trustor company and its directors have only the trustor
business, with so many investment trusts being managed by the same
trustor (with the same objective in investment and the same stocks in
78 Members are listed in INVESTMENT TRUST ASS'N (Sh6ken T6shi Shiutaku
Kyokai), INVESTMENT TRUST IN JAPAN (1963). Of the Association of the 14 invest-
ment trust management companies, 13 have their parents' name and 8 of the 14 are
officed at the same address. See also NOMURA SECURITIES INVESTMENT TRUST MAN-
AGEMENT Co., LTD., A BRIEF OUTLINE OF INVESTMENT TRUSTS IN JAPAN 2 (1963)
which refers to the management companies as independent and adds: "The relations
between the securities firms and the management companies are still very close as
the former remain as parent firms over the latter."
The amount of interlocking officers and directors and control allowed the parent com-
panies is detailed in note 32, supra.
79 The Wharton Study op. cit. supra note 74, at 463 finds: "In many cases, the dis-
tinction between the advisor and client company is strictly legal, the investment
company possessing no office or personnel independent of that of its agent, the invest-
ment adviser."
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many cases) there could arise a conflict of interest in the duty to each
trust. For example, when an attractive purchase is available, which
trust is to be given the opportunity? When it is deemed advisable to
sell a security that may be held by each of twenty different investment
trusts, which trust sells its holding first on a declining market; or
might all be sold at the same time at a discount by reason of the size
of the disposition? Given these facts, the principle of investor pro-
tection may well resolve itself into a matter of the enlightened self-
interest of the trustor and securities companies, themselves subject to
the degree of control the Minister of Finance deems appropriate.
Some of the conflict of interest problems posed have been previously
stated as involving Civil Code article 108 providing that one person
cannot act for both sides in a legal act. It is more clearly put by noting
that article 20 and article 26(3) of the Trust Law" require the direc-
tors of a trustor company to serve the best interest of the trust, while
corporation law requires a director to "make his greatest efforts in
the interest of the corporation and he should on no account have his
hand in dealings that bring or result in profit to himself or to a third
party, against or at the sacrifice of the interest of the company."'" A
director serving a securities company with investment trusts must try
to serve two masters in their business of buying, selling and holding
securities in a situation in which every transaction will be presently or
ultimately to the advantage of one and the disadvantage of the other.
It is suggested that in a universe where these same securities companies
control the securities markets, this conflict is not fully resolved by a
requirement that buying and selling between the trust and its manager,
officers and 10% shareholders be through the market."2
Some of the same variety of potential conflicts of interest that exist
in the investment trust industry were noted in the Wharton Study and
occasioned the following findings. The special characteristics of mu-
tual funds with an external adviser closely affiliated with the manage-
ment of the fund tend to weaken the bargaining position of the fund
in the establishment of advisory rates." The disposition of brokerage
business by investment companies is considered a source of possible
80 Art. 20: "A trustee shall manage trust affairs with the case of a good manager
in compliance with the tenor and purport of the trust." Art. 26, (3) : "Any person
who manages trust affairs in place of the trustee shall assume the same responsibility
as the trustee." 6 EHS No. 6130.
81 Yochinaga, The Medium and Small Enterprise in Japan and Their Porm of
Corporation. 1 HITOTStBASHI JOURNAL OF LAW AND PoLITIcs 23 (1960).
82 Securities Investment Trust Law, art. 16 and 17.
83 Wharton Study, op. cit. supra note 74, at 30.
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conflict of interest, particularly where the manager is affiliated with the
broker. The close affiliation of manager and broker tends to result
in the fund not receiving the most advantageous return. The study
notes that valuable services, including investment research, can be
secured in return for receiving brokerage which may be lost by reason
of the tendency of the manager to award itself or affiliate the broker-
age.84 In addition to direct participation of investment advisers in the
distribution of shares and brokerage, in many cases advisers and con-
trol groups participate in these activities indirectly, through parents,
subsidiaries, or otherwise affiliated organizations.8" Funds in which the
controlling organization or individual of the fund were affiliated with a
broker exhibited higher turnover rates than did the industry as a whole
in every year from 1953 through 1958,8" indicating such relationship
encouraged buying and selling-enhancing the profits of the broker
and the expense to the fund. (We will note that the rate of turnover
of Japanese investment trust securities indicates that this is not the
case in Japan.)
The existing mechanisms for protecting shareholder and public
interests primarily include the required provision of information to
shareholders, shareholder voting rights, the legal obligation to select
independent directors, limitations on principal transactions by affil-
iated persons, and supervisory protection. The findings with reference
to the effectiveness of these provisions indicate:
1. Investors pay little attention to most of the protections provided
by the Act of 1940, feeling they are fully protected from abuse by
government regulations such as The Act and other securities leg-
islation. Shareholders look to the fund management not only
for diversification but for expert management and devotion to
shareholders' interests. It is thought possible, that in spite of the
information provided, shareholders are led by the structure of
formal relationships into supposing that their fund is a truly
independent organization, whose officers and directors negotiate
at arm's length on their behalf with the investment adviser in
fixing fees, deciding on brokerage allocations, continuing the serv-
ices of the investment adviser or broker based on an appraisal of
the adequacy of performance, fairness of charges, etc.89 These
84 Id. at 32-34, 435. 87 Id. at 34.
85 Id. at 435. 88 Id. at 3.
86 Id. at 20. 89 Id. at 33.
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findings if related to the Japanese industry should note the
tendency (not observed in the investment company industry) of
U.S. investors to protect their rights whereas the Japanese, as
noted, tend to either have no consciousness of individual rights
or to sublimate such consciousness.
2. Investor protection through voting rights, annual meetings, and
independent directors may be contrary to the realities and of
limited value in the mutual fund industry, serving primarily as
potential checks in preventing major abuse. 0 It is considered that
the redemption privilege is largely responsible in the United
States for the apathy of investors who will register their dis-
approval by selling rather than using the rights provided by law. 9'
Shareholder attendance at meetings has been low and voting has
been primarily by proxy; hence, management control has been a
virtually automatic consequence of the possession of the corporate
proxy machinery by the promoting management adviser.92 The
SEC is currently examining the position of the independent
directors, plus whether the investment company directors as a
whole safeguard the rights of shareholders, particularly where
some of the directors have a potential conflict of interest by reason
of their other business interests as fund officer, adviser, or under-
writer. 3 We have previously noted that Japanese investment
trusts have no voting privileges for their beneficiaries, nor any
meetings. The independence of directors, if any, is not covered
by law or regulation.
3. One of the most powerful and important shareholder protections
incorporated into the Investment Company Act was the section 17
limitation upon sales and purchases of securities and other prop-
erties between investment companies and affiliated persons. This
section has virtually eliminated several classes of transactions
associated with major abuses of the past." The Japanese counter-
part, articles 16 and 17 of the Law, by failing to include directors
and affiliated or controlled persons has left a wide door open to
transactions in derogation of the best interests of the investors.
4. No comments or findings were addressed to the SEC, the super-
visory authority, who sponsored the study, but we may note that
90 Id. at 7, 8, 35, 453. 93 Business Week, March 7, 1964, p. 88.
91 Id. at 63-69. 94 Wharton Study, op. cit. supra note 74, at 35.
92 Id. at 465-466.
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in Japan the trustor licensing and trust contract approval powers
of the Ministry of Finance are very broad, allowing it, at these
points, broad discretion. With so much power, it is important to
note that the Ministry of Finance is not an independent agency,
as is the SEC, but is subject to political pressures and changes.
Size. An original purpose of the Wharton Study was to investigate
the relationships of the size of investment companies (funds) and their
investment advisers to the securities markets and to the policies of
portfolio companies." We will now note the findings in these regards
and also the effect of size as it affects the investors in the fund, i.e.,
in performance.
The Study found that managing and advising funds did not require
large capital or large numbers of employees,96 that 163 investment
advisers with a median of 4 shareholders managed and generally con-
trolled 232 funds with a median of 8,792 shareholders." Over one-half
of these advisers had net worth of less than $100,000 and 28 had less
than $10,000." 8 Only one adviser had as many as 600 employees
(mostly sales employees). Of the advisers supervising assets of over
$600 million, the two whose major activity was advisory had less than
100 employees, one of them having fewer than 50."
Most important to investor welfare is the performance of the funds
in maintaining and increasing the income and the value of the assets
administered. The Study found there was no appreciable difference in
the performance of funds with less than $10 million in assets and those
with over $300 million in assets,"' nor was there a strong tendency for
the new funds to perform either better or worse than the established
ones.'
0°
The Japanese Big Four securities firms, the original trustors of the
first investment trusts, each have a capitalization of Y8,000 million
($22.2 million) and average 8,000 employees each. 2 These four
account, directly, for over 80% of all investment trust assets, and in
association with eight of the medium-sized securities companies, for
97% of this more than $3 billion industry.0 3 We have noted that the
951d. at ix. 98 Id. at 433. 101 Id. at 354.
01 Id. at 444. 99 Id. at 444.
97 Id. at 27, 461. 100 Id. at 298, 306.102 The Japan Times, May 29, 1963 (Foreign Investment Supp.), p. B4. Nikko
Securities Company and Nomura Securities Company increased their capitalizations to
Y12,000 million in the summer of 1963
103 Id. at B7. Research Dept. of The Nomura Securities Co. Manual of Securities
Statistics 201 (Rev. ed. 1963). Of the medium-sized securities firms, considered to
number 10, only Daish6 and Nippon Kangya are considered entirely independent of
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1951 Law requires ¥50 million in capital and the personnel, experience,
and ability to invest in the market as a trustor of an investment trust.
We have also noted the securities companies argued the necessity of
large size when negotiating the terms of the legal separation of their
trustor functions to new management companies." 4
Portfolio Company Control. The Wharton Study reported that
outright control of portfolio companies by mutual funds was a rarity
and is confined mainly to small portfolio companies in need of venture
capital. Further, that neither the extent nor character of fund influence
over these mainly commercial and industrial concerns appeared to
warrant serious concern.10 5 The funds generally sell such securities
rather than attempt to exert their influence."0 8 Virtually all funds vote
at annual election by giving their proxies to the management com-
mittee of the company involved.01
The U.S. funds under study were limited to maintaining 75% of
their assets in companies in which they hold 10% or less of the out-
standing voting securities.0 8 In Japan the Ministry of Finance ap-
proved terms of trust limiting the holdings of any single investment
trust or any group of investment trusts under one trustor to 20% of the
outstanding voting securities of any one portfolio company.109 Also to
be noted with respect to this issue in Japan is the fact that the usual
capitalization ratio of stock companies in Japan is two-thirds debt
and one-third equity.110 In practice, voting rights are assigned either
to the portfolio company itself or an independent person, irrespective
of the amount held.' 1 '
Impact on the Market. The Wharton Study made findings of the
impact of mutual fund activity not only on the level of prices but also
on the relative stability of prices (the extent to which fund activity
moderates or accentuates market movements).
U.S. mutual funds, with a much smaller percentage of the total
market value of listed stocks and of daily transactions in those stocks
than that of the Japanese investment trusts, significantly and sub-
the "Big Four". Nomura is reportedly more or less connected with four of these
medium-sized firms, and Yamaichi Securities Co., Ltd., with three of them.
104 See note 32 supra.
105 Wharton Study, op. cit. supra note 74, at 26.
108 Id. at 26.
107 Id. at 417.
108 15 U.S.C. § 80a -5(b) (1) (1958). See text p. 537 supra.
109 See note 58 supra.
110 Christensen, Japanese Equity Financing, 38 WAsH. L. REv. 107 (1963)
11" See note 54 supra.
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stantially affected the daily movements in the stock market and
possibly the month-to-month movements," 2 and have, together with
other factors, stimulated stock prices markedly during the past decade
of rapid growth of the investment company industry."' The Japanese
Investment Trust Association states that investment trusts in Japan
have contributed to the stability and expansion of Japan's securities
markets."'
With respect to the stabilizing or de-stabilizing influence of mutual
funds it was found that the turnover rate of stock holdings in the
various funds was higher than the rate of turnover of all stocks listed
on the New York Exchange." 5  Such a finding is indicative of a
de-stabilizing influence inasmuch as a further finding was made that
funds tended to trade with, rather than against, the trend in the
cyclical movement of stock prices." 6
In Japan, the percentage of total stock transactions by investment
trusts compared to the total of all transactions on the securities ex-
changes indicates a low turnover rate of portfolio stocks-in the last
six years less than the percentage ratio of total stocks held to the
total of listed stocks." 7 This indicates a stabilizing effect on the
market. Other factors, such as the investment trusts' five-year growth
rate of more than fourteen-fold" 8 (while the U.S. mutual funds were
experiencing an annual fourteen per cent increase in assets from the
sale of new shares),"' and the monthly redemption of unit investment
trusts which have reached their five-year maturity will influence prices
and the stability of the market.
The findings and conclusions of the Wharton Study on fund influ-
ence on prices and markets in the United States (where mutual funds
hold approximately four and one-half per cent of the value of all
listed stocks on the New York Stock Exchange 2 compared to the
112 Wharton Study, op. cit. supra note 74, at 21.
"'3 Id. at 359.
114 INVESTMENT TRUST Ass'N, op. cit. supra note 78, at 26.
"' Wharton Study, op. cit. supra note 74, at 15.
116 Id. at xi, xii. However, the Investment Company Institute in a monograph
prepared for the Commission on Money and Credit, states that "Studies conducted of
the operations of investment companies in all down periods of the stock market in the
last 15 years have shown the investment companies to be stabilizing influences, thus
aiding the orderly operation of the capital markets." INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTI-
TUTE, MANAGEMENT INVESTMENT COMPANIES 90 (1962).
117 NOMURA SECURITIES INVESTMENT TRUST MANAGEMENT Co., LTD., op. cit. supra
note 78, at 23.
118 Id. at 21.
119 Wharton Study, op. cit. supra note 74, at 5.
12075.5% of the funds' common stock purchases are conducted through the New
York Stock Exchange. Id. at 13.
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Japanese investment trusts holdings of 14% of the total market value
of all listed stocks) should a fortiori hold true of the influence of
Japanese investment trusts on prices and markets. Further, such
influence may well increase at a geometrically greater rate than the
arithmetical increase in the market value of securities held by invest-
ment trusts to the total market value of all listed securities.
Performance. It has been well said, particularly from the stand-
point of the investor "the reason for being of any trust-[is] to secure
better than average results."''
The Wharton Study found no significant difference or relation:
(1) in the year-by-year or cumulative performance between the
funds without an outside investment adviser and those with an
outside adviser;' 22
(2) as compared with funds of comparable type and size between
the performance of broker-affiliated funds and that of funds
without those affiliations; 2
(3) as noted above,'2 ' between the performance of small-size funds
and large size funds or new funds and older funds;
(4) between the rates of management fees paid by the funds and
their cumulative performance results;' 25
(5) between sales charges and the funds cumulative performance
results. 2
The Study found very few funds that recorded consistently either
superior or inferior performance.
The findings on the performance of the funds as a group were to
the effect that:
(1) mutual funds may have the ability to fulfill their own market
predictions, and in particular to validate their own appraisal of
the market movement of individual issues;2
(2) they may possess the ability to pick the most profitable pros-
pects," 8 but also no superior or inferior ability was shown to
121 BULLOCK, THE STORY OF INVESTMENT COmpANIEs 97 (1959).
122 Wharton Study, op. cit. supra note 74, at 494.
123 Id. at 349.
224 See text accompanying notes 99, 100 supra.
125 Wharton Study, op. cit. supra note 74, at 345.
126 Id. at 347.
'127 Id. at 358.
128 Id. at 360.
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direct capital into particularly profitable areas of economic
investment'29 (diversification may tend to obscure such ability).
(3) There was no showing of positive correlation between the funds'
selections and an increase in per share earnings of those
selected;.3 o and
(4) comparisons suggest that the funds' performance approximated
that of a common stock average."
No comparative analyses of Japanese investment trusts as among
trusts of the same type or between trusts as a whole and the market
averages have been studied. The previous references to the degree of
concentration of the industry would be pertinent in evaluating such
studies.
Conclusion. The tremendous growth in assets of Japanese Invest-
ment trusts resulting in an expanded share of the securities markets
is of significance to the Japanese economy. An acquaintance with this
industry is of necessary importance to an understanding of Japanese
securities markets. The evolution of an investment media to protect
the investor by spreading his risk, providing experienced and profes-
sional investment advice (i.e., persons of integrity who are dedicated
solely to the best interests of their clients and who would not allow
their judgments to be compromised by attempting to serve competitive
or conflicting interests) at a cost that will not eliminate the small
investor, and will at the same time, protect the national economy and
the money market is a worthy task, best approached with an under-
standing of the accomplishments and failings of the past.
129 Id. at 393.
130 Id. at 393.
131 Id. at 295.
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